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 I. Introduction 
 Much of the literature in monetary economics discusses how to create credible 
institutions which would stabilise inflation expectations at low levels, prevent the creation of 
a political business cycle etc. (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1993). In reality, however, it 
may prove difficult for some countries to gain credibility quickly through domestic 
institutional arrangements. After all, any independent central bank can be subject to political 
pressure in practice, any law on the central bank can be changed and the conservative central 
banker (Rogoff, 1985) replaced, the incentive contract for central banker (Walsh, 1995) may 
not be eventually enforced etc. For institutional arrangements to be effective in giving 
credibility to monetary policy, the legal and political institutions must themselves be credible.  
In some countries, though, this may not be the case - for example at the beginning of 
economic transition from central planning to democracy when the political culture is not fully 
established. At the same time, reputation cannot work as a source of credibility in transition 
countries, as these have no history of independent central banking. The lack of reputation and 
political credibility may also constitute a problem in some emerging economies with a non-
democratic past and/or high-inflationary history. 
Therefore, many transition and emerging market economies have used a different 
approach to resolving the credibility problem – importing low inflation from abroad via a 
fixed exchange rate. This approach, however, is not without drawbacks. Obstfeld (1994; 
1996a,b) has demonstrated that under some circumstances it can give rise to self-fulfilling 
currency crises. To avoid this danger, the exchange rate peg has to be designed in a very 
credible way that greatly reduces the possibility of a flexible monetary policy response to 
shocks. Indeed, the current trend in exchange rate regimes favours the two corner solutions – 
either a fully flexible exchange rate, or a rigidly fixed exchange rate (“hard peg”) that is close 
to a de-facto monetary union (i.e. currency boards or dollarization/euroization). Dornbusch 
and Giavazzi (1998), for example, have suggested that the Central European countries should 
adopt currency boards to resolve their credibility problem. And currently, as the EU-accession 
date approaches, many argue for a fast eurozone entry, too.  
However, creating a monetary union, or something that closely resembles it, is not 
without costs. The traditional optimum-currency-area literature has put much emphasis on the 
problem of stabilising asymmetric shocks which becomes more painful when the exchange 
rate is fixed and there in no sufficient factor mobility between countries. The lack of 
flexibility is thus both an advantage of hard pegs, and at the same time one of their greatest 
drawbacks. Which of these two aspects dominates depends on the circumstances, for example 
on each country’s credibility deficit and its degree of integration with the reference currency 
area.  
In other words, the credibility-import considerations must be combined with the 
optimum-currency-area considerations to find out which exchange rate regime appears to be 
the most suitable one. So far, this has not been so common in the literature, probably because 
the optimum currency area theory used to be predominantly applied to study the monetary 
integration between EU countries, which have mostly managed to solve their credibility 
problems in monetary policy by domestic institutional arrangements (perhaps with some 
exceptions). The aim of this paper is to partly make up for this deficit. The strategy is to use 
the basic Obstfeld (1996a) model of self-fulfilling currency crises and introduce a simple 
optimum-currency-area aspect into it. Section II reviews very briefly the basic Obstfeld 
model. In section III, I introduce foreign supply-side shocks, study its implications and show 
how the degree of integration between economies affects the outcome. Section IV discusses 
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consequences of the theory for present and future monetary policy in the Czech Republic, and 
section V concludes.         
II. Obstfeld Model and Its Implications 
2]
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I will start with a simple model of the dynamic inconsistency in monetary policy. The 
model is based on three equations:  
t
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where y denotes (a natural logarithm of) GDP, y* the long-run equilibrium level of GDP, y** 
is the optimal level of output, π the rate of inflation, πE the expected inflation, z is a white-
noise supply-side shock (a positive z means an adverse shock), and χ is the weight put on 
inflation in the central bank’s loss function.  
 Equation (1) is a short-run expectations-augmented Phillips curve. It says that the 
deviations of GDP from its long-run equilibrium can be caused by inflationary (or 
deflationary) surprises. For simplicity, and without much loss of generality, I assume that the 
slope of short-run supply curve is equal to one. The GDP is also influenced by supply-side 
shocks. Equation (2) represents the one-period loss function of the central bank, where χ is 
the weight put on inflation and y** is the optimal level of output. In other words, the central 
bank takes into account the costs associated with current inflation and the cost of output’s 
deviations from its optimum. Equation (3) is the standard assumption of the dynamic 
inconsistency literature (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983a,b). It defines a 
measure of the inflationary bias, or credibility deficit,  stemming from the fact that the optimal 
output targeted by the central bank exceeds the equilibrium level of output.  
It is easy to show that in this setting the central bank’s reaction function is given by (see 
e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996; Čihák and Holub, 1999) 
χ
ππ
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which means that the model has a unique (Nash) equilibrium at   
π χt
E k=            
  (5). 
This shows an inflationary bias of the central bank, as the average inflation rate is above zero. 
An optimal institutional setting of the monetary policy would have to assure that the central 
bank’s policy rule is   
χπ += 1
t
t
z
           
  (6), 
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as this eliminates the inflationary bias, and at the same time preserves optimal responses to 
supply-side shocks.   
 I will assume in this essay that the home country is not able to solve its inflationary 
bias by domestic institutional arrangements, e.g. by appointing a conservative central banker 
(see Rogoff, 1985) or by signing an optimal central bank contract (see Walsh, 1995), but the 
central bank has a limited capacity to commit itself to a pegged exchange rate.1 If it does so, 
its loss function modifies to (see Obstfeld, 1996a,b). 
otherwise     0                              
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         (7), 
where Λt is the standard loss function defined in (2), and C represents the central bank’s cost 
of breaking its exchange rate commitment, which is equal to c  for a devaluation and  c  for a 
revaluation.  
Following the standard textbook approach, I will assume for the moment that the 
foreign country to which the exchange rate is pegged maintains zero inflation. Furthermore, I 
will assume that the relative purchasing power parity holds perfectly, which means that the 
exchange rate can be sustained only if the domestic inflation is exactly equal to the foreign 
one, which is zero.2 As a result, we can rewrite (7) as  
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If the central bank maintains the exchange rate peg, the value of its loss function reaches  
[ 2tEtfixt zk ++=Λ π ]           
 (9). 
On the other hand, if the central bank decides to realign the exchange rate, it chooses the rate 
of inflation in line with equation (4). As a result, the value of its loss function is 
( ) [ ]2
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Clearly, the rational strategy for the central bank is to devalue if there is an adverse 
supply-side shock strong enough to cause 
[ ] czkc tEtfloattfixt >+++⇔>Λ−Λ 21 1      πχ        
 (11). 
                                                 
1 Frankel (1995),  for example, assumes that the central bank cannot directly commit to the policy rule of 
equation (6), but can commit to a range of operational rules, for example to a pegged exchange rate, money 
supply rule, inflation targeting rule, nominal GDP rule etc.   
2 Arguably, the assumption that the relative PPP holds perfectly is a big simplification that does not correspond 
to the empirical experience, at least for the short-run horizon. But it is a standard assumption in this model, and I 
thus decided to keep it. Perhaps we could also interpret this assumption more loosely as follows: by fixing the 
exchange rate, the country gives up the chance to systematically influence its inflation rate, which is then 
primarily affected by foreign inflation. 
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From (11), we can find out the critical level of supply-side shock zt, above which the central 
bank devalues as   
( ) Ett kcz πχ −−+= 1           
 (12). 
 Similarly, a revaluation is carried out if there is a favourable supply-side shock strong 
enough to cause  
[ ] czkc tEtfloattfixt >+++⇔>Λ−Λ 21 1      πχ        
 (13), 
or in other words, if zt is below3   
( ) Ett kcz πχ −−+−= 1           
 (14). 
 In this setting, the rational expectation of inflation before the supply-side shock is 
realised is given by 
( ) { } { } { } { }ttttttttttt zzPzzEzzPzzEE >>+<<= // πππ     (15), 
where E denotes mathematical expectations and P is probability. The rational expectation of 
inflation is thus a function of the critical levels of supply-side shock tz  and tz , which 
themselves depend on the level of inflation expected by the economic agents (πE). If we 
assume that people’s expectations are formed rationally, i.e. that in equilibrium  
( tEt E ππ = )
                                                
           
 (16), 
there is a two-way relationship between expectations and the critical levels of supply-side 
shocks. This can potentially lead to multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling currency crises. 
Obstfeld (1996a) demonstrates this fact using an assumption that the supply-side shocks 
are uniformly distributed on a closed interval, let’s say [-Z;Z].4 He shows that the 
“expectations schedule”5  may have the shape illustrated in Figure 1. In this case, there are 
three rational-expectations equilibria. The equilibrium number 1 corresponds to the 
inflationary, full-discretionary outcome of equation (5). In this equilibrium, the economic 
agents expect the central bank to devaluate regardless of the level of supply-side shock, and 
the central bank confirms these expectations as it does not want to impose on the economy the 
high costs of an economic recession. On the other hand, the point 3 in Figure 1 is a low-
inflation equilibrium that demonstrates the potential benefits of using a pegged exchange rate 
to import anti-inflationary credibility from abroad. At the same time, however, it demonstrates 
its disadvantages. As we can see, the expected inflation in this equilibrium can be 
 
 (1996b) illustra
3 Note that for the central bank to desire a revaluation, the argument in the square bracket of inequality (13) 
needs to be negative. This leads to the negative sign in front of the square root function in equation (14).  
4 Obstfeld tes the same multiple equilibria problem using a “tent-shaped” density function ( ) ( ) 2ZzZzg tt −= for . [ ]ZZzt ;−∈
5 This expectations schedule is a counterpart of the reaction function in the basic dynamic inconsistency model. 
It is not a “true” reaction function, however, as it does not show what the central bank in fact does in every state 
of the world. Instead, it shows what the central bank is expected to do before the state of the world is revealed, 
depending on the level of inflation expected by the economic agents. 
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substantially lower than in equilibrium number 1, but is still above zero. Consequently, in 
most “normal periods”, i.e. when supply-side shocks are relatively small and the central bank 
maintains the exchange rate peg, the economy operates under its potential, as the actual 
inflation is below the expected one (see Obstfeld, 1996a,b). This, of course, may erode 
political support for the pegged exchange rate. Finally, there is also an unstable equilibrium 2, 
which I am not going to discuss in detail here. 
 
Figure 1: The Expectations Schedule  
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The possibility of multiple equilibria arises in this setting only if at χπ kEt =  (i.e. at 
the point corresponding to full-discretionary equilibrium), the exchange rate commitment has 
no practical value, as tt zzZ >>−  (i.e. a devaluation always takes place). Therefore, the 
multiple equilibria can be eliminated if the country satisfies the condition  
( ) Zkc −>+−+ χ
χχ 11           
 (17). 
This means that a self-fulfilling currency crisis is the less likely to occur: 
(i) the higher is c ;  
(ii) the lower is k;  
(iii) the higher is χ;  
(iv) the higher is Z.  
The results (ii) and (iii) are very intuitive, but their value for policy-making is rather 
limited. The problem of self-fulfilling currency crisis is eliminated if the central bank has a 
high anti-inflationary credibility, and its temptation to devalue the currency is low. 
Unfortunately, this only says that importing low inflation via a pegged exchange rate is least 
problematic in those cases when it is least needed, as the country has managed to institute 
low-inflationary environment by domestic arrangements. It can thus hardly serve as a policy 
guide how to import low inflation from abroad in those circumstances when domestic 
institutions are not perceived as credible.  
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The result (iv) is neither very intuitive, nor useful for policy purposes. Intuitively, we 
would expect that in a country with high variability of supply-side shocks (i.e. with high Z), 
the exchange rate realignments are more likely to take place. However, this is indeed true if 
we are speaking about devaluations or revaluations that are caused by actual shocks. In our 
case, however, we are analysing purely self-fulfilling (or “sunspot”) currency crises that are 
not justified by macroeconomic fundamentals but by more-or-less random changes in market 
expectations. A high volatility of supply-side shocks reduces the danger of self-fulfilling 
crises because it is then possible that a strongly positive shock will occur which will enable 
the central bank to sustain the exchange rate peg even with high-inflationary expectations 
( χπ kEt = ) with some positive probability. As a result, the mathematical expectations of the 
inflation will be below χπ kEt = , meaning that this point is not an equilibrium. It is clear, 
however, that trying to eliminate the multiple equilibria by increasing the variability of real 
shocks is not a choice for the policy makers, as it would (if possible at all) reduce social 
welfare. 
We are thus left with the result (i), which is both intuitive and useful for policy making. 
It says that a stronger political commitment to the exchange rate peg reduces the possibility of 
self-fulfilling currency crises. What are its policy implications for the institutions-designing 
phase of the game? Formally, it adds another constraint to the optimisation problem of the 
policy makers. Before Obstfeld (1994; 1996a,b) pointed out to the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, the optimal institutional choice was thought of as a solution to the maximisation 
problem              
( ) [ ]( )22t, ∗∗−+=Λ yyEEMax ttcc χπ         
 (18), 
subject to constraints (1), (12), (14), (15), (16).6 Obstfeld’s theoretical message means that the 
policy-makers should consider constraint (17), as well. Otherwise, it is a pure gamble to rely 
on an exchange rate peg, as we cannot (due to the multiple equilibria problem) assign a 
probability distribution to its survival.7       
As far as the practical policy-making is concerned, however, we can question whether 
the central bank is really able to recognise perfectly the range of exchange rate commitments 
that are sufficient to prevent the self-fulfilling crises, and then choose from this range the 
arrangement which maximises the expected social utility. After all, the quantitative results of 
the model depend on its structure and timing of events, on the exact distribution and nature of 
shocks, on the perceptions of market participants about the credibility of exchange rate 
commitments and so on, which may all be sources of substantial uncertainty for policy 
makers. As a result, the message of the Obstfeld model for practical purposes is usually being 
interpreted as an argument for corner (or “polar”) exchange rate solutions. The central bank 
should either make a fixed exchange rate regime extremely credible, or it should rather avoid 
using it to import low inflation at all.8,9 This is indeed the trend that has been observed in the 
                                                 
6 An important example of the literature on optimal escape clauses in monetary policy is Lohmann (1992).  
7 In the dynamic inconsistency model of exchange rate pegs, though, the worst possible outcome that is achieved 
when the country devalues is the full-discretionary equilibrium. As a result, even if there is a danger a self-
fulfilling currency crises, it may be beneficial to peg the exchange rate as long as its perceived probability of 
survival is not zero. In practice, however, currency crises seem to be associated with high real costs and systemic 
risks, that may far exceed the potential social losses associated with the discretionary equilibrium. 
8 This opinion is clearly expressed, for example, in the final report of the International Financial Institution 
Advisory Commission, established by the US Congress and chaired by A. Meltzer. The report says: “The 
Commission recommends that countries avoid pegged or adjustable rate systems.  The IMF should use its policy 
9 
reality of recent years, as Figure 2 illustrates (see Fischer, 2001). While many countries have 
recently moved to a greater exchange rate flexibility, some other emerging and transition 
economies have adopted “currency boards” (or dollarized/euroized their economies).10,11 On 
the contrary, the number of countries with intermediate exchange rate regimes has declined 
significantly.  
 
Figure 2: The “Bipolar” View in Practice 
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The currency boards (or dollarization/euroization) have also become increasingly 
popular among some theoretical economists. For example, Dornbusch and Giavazzi (1998) 
have suggested that adopting currency boards would be the best monetary arrangement for 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe to solve their credibility problems and 
lack of competence for running independent monetary policies. 
What is the fundamental difference between a currency board and a standard fixed 
exchange rate? Hanke and Schuler (1994), for example, define a currency board as “a 
monetary institution that issues notes and coins (and, in some cases, deposits) fully backed by 
a foreign “reserve” currency and fully convertible into the reserve currency at a fixed rate and 
                                                                                                                                                        
consultations to recommend either firmly fixed rates (currency board, dollarization) or fluctuating rates.  Neither 
fixed nor fluctuating rates are appropriate for all countries or all times. Experience shows, however, that mixed 
systems such as pegged rates or fixed-but-adjustable rates increase the risk and severity of crises.” 
9 One reservation has to be made at this point, though. The above conclusions relate only to those cases when an 
exchange rate peg is used to import credibility and low inflation from abroad. There may be situations, however, 
when the exchange rate is pegged between countries with credible monetary policies for some other reasons 
(stabilising the conditions for foreign trade, reducing exchange rate risks etc.). In these circumstances, the 
problem of self-fulfilling currency crises may be less relevant (see results (ii) and (iii) above), and  
non-polar exchange rate regimes may thus still be applicable.    
10  The following text draws on a collaborated work with M. Čihák (see  Čihák, Holub, 2000).  
11 Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria etc. are examples in Central and Eastern Europe, Argentina used to be a Latin 
American case. 
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on demand.” While this (quite a standard) definition captures the main “visible” features of a 
currency board, it says relatively little about its essence. Even with a standard exchange rate 
peg, the central bank commits itself to a fixed exchange rate between the domestic currency 
and the reserve currency, and usually maintains full convertibility, too. Moreover, many 
central banks that maintain exchange rate pegs are also close to the 100 % coverage of the 
domestic monetary base by foreign exchange reserves. It is a common misunderstanding to 
say that normal central banks are not strong enough to defend exchange rate pegs, as their 
foreign exchange reserves are negligible compared to private international capital flows, 
while currency boards are able to defend the fixed exchange rate because their currencies are 
fully covered by foreign exchange reserves.12 
As has been illustrated by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996), many of the central banks 
that faced currency crises in early-1990s had sufficient foreign exchange reserves to buy out 
the whole monetary base. In Table 1, I reproduce their evidence, and add data on the 
emerging and transition economies that were hit by currency turmoil in the second half of 
1990s. As we can see, in most cases the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to the monetary 
base exceeded 100 % or was just marginally below this level before the crises broke out, the 
only exceptions being Italy in 1992 and Russia in 1998. True, we may object against the 
Obstfeld and Rogoff’s argument that normal central banks – unlike theoretically pure 
currency boards – have other liabilities besides the monetary base that can serve for some 
economic agents (banks, government etc.) as secondary reserves.13 It is thus probably better 
to compare the foreign exchange reserves of central banks with their total liabilities (except 
their own capital), and not just with the monetary base. Nevertheless, even this ratio exceeded 
80 % in many countries (see Table 1). We can thus conclude, that the financial strength of 
these central banks to defend their currencies was relatively large, in many cases of the same 
order as the strength of currency boards.   
 
                                                 
12 At this point, we should note that even with a currency board, the foreign exchange reserves do not cover the 
total money supply, but the monetary base only. The total money supply thus can exceed the foreign exchange 
reserves several times, depending on the size of money multiplier. For example in 1998, the ratio of foreign 
exchange reserves to broad money (M2) reached 52 % in Estonia, 31 % in Argentina and 27 % in Hong Kong. 
To compare, in the Czech Republic the corresponding figure was 33 %.  
13 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996) used the data from the International Financial Statistics published by the 
IMF. The definition of monetary base in this publication is broader than the narrow definition used by the Czech 
National Bank. It thus includes, for example, the liabilities of the Czech National Bank to the commercial banks 
resulting from reverse repo-operations. These liabilities serve as a major source of secondary liquidity reserves 
to the commercial banks in the Czech Republic. The Obstfeld and Rogoff’s figures thus in fact take an important 
part of the secondary liquidity reserves into account.   
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Table 1: FX Reserves (in % of monetary base and total CB’s liabilities) 
Country Year RE/MB RE/TL Country Year RE/MB RE/TL 
Finland 1992 95 79 Czech Rep. 1997 108 84 
France 1992 116 80 Philippines 1997 120 55 
Italy 1992 46 45 Indonesia 1997 162 82 
Ireland 1992 147 94 South Korea 1997 110 46 
Norway 1992 214 65 Malaysia 1997 100 76 
Portugal 1992 137 96 Thailand 1997 215 119 
Spain  1992 87 86 Greece 1997 127 44 
Sweden  1992 112 54 Brazil 1998 92 35 
UK 1992 109 63 Russia 1998 61 41 
Mexico 1994 159 88 Slovak Rep. 1998 123 83 
Source: International Monetary Fund, own computations 
Note: The data relate to the beginning of each year; RE = FX reserves; MB = monetary base 
(currency + bank reserves, as defined in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics); TL = 
monetary base, foreign liabilities, liabilities to commercial banks and the government.  
 
 In spite of this, most central banks eventually gave up their fight for the currency, 
often long before their foreign exchange reserves have been exhausted. A typical example is 
the Czech National Bank in May 1997 which held USD 11.5 bn. of reserves at that time, but 
decided to float the currency having spent just USD 1.5 bn. (and even this was criticised by 
some analysts and politicians as “wasted money”).  
Why was this the case? In answering this question, we can come back to the Obstfeld 
model. The reason for early abandoning of the exchange rate pegs by most central banks is the 
fact that, in addition to the exchange rate target (and price stability goal), they follow also 
other goals. These include the economic growth (which is the case in Obstfeld model), low 
volatility of interest rates, or stability of the banking sector. Should a central bank decide to 
fight for the currency to the bitter ends, it would have to cease functioning as a lender of the 
last resort to commercial banks and buy back a substantial portion of its monetary base in 
exchange for foreign reserves. This would, in theory, mean a decline of the money supply 
towards zero, which would have devastating real effects: a jump-up in nominal interest rates, 
deflation, deep economic recession and liquidity crisis of the financial sector. These costs are 
so high that even a strongly politically independent central bank cannot afford impose them 
on the economy. This fact, however, leads to the danger of self-fulfilling currency crises. The 
economic agents know that the central bank will always devalue if there is a currency crisis 
which may itself give them an incentive to speculate against the currency, and thus cause the 
crisis. On the other hand, if everybody believes that the exchange rate will be maintained, no 
crises happens.  
What is the fundamental difference with a currency board? Even in this monetary policy 
regime, a speculative attack on the currency may take place, and its consequences are equally 
12 
hard as under a radical defence of a standard exchange rate peg.14 The key difference, 
however, consists in the fact that a currency board does not bear any responsibility for the 
above consequences. Its role is not to serve as a lender of the last resort and regulator of 
commercial banks, and it can thus be hardly criticised for a banking crisis. Similarly, a 
currency board is by definition forbidden to run an independent monetary policy - it even does 
not have people to do that. Therefore, it cannot be blamed for a deflation and economic 
recession. Moreover, it is relatively difficult (though not impossible) to make changes to the 
exchange rate under a currency board, as it typically requires a decision from by the 
parliament and not just an independent decision of the monetary authority. From this point of 
view, a currency board is a self-destructing commitment to the fixed exchange rate (or a 
“poison pill”, to use the terminology of Dornbusch and Giavazzi, 1998), which is its 
fundamental difference from a standard exchange rate peg. Interpreting this conclusion from 
the perspective of Obstfeld model, a currency board is an institutional setting that makes the 
costs of realignments c  and  c  extremely high. The reason for doing this is to eliminate the 
danger of self-fulfilling currency crises. The experience of 1997-98 suggests that it may really 
work in practice, at least partially.15       
For all of the above, I will assume from now on that the government in principle faces a 
zero-one choice: it can either make an extreme exchange rate commitment, that is close to a 
monetary union (which an orthodox currency board is), or give up any effort to import low 
inflation from abroad. What is the right choice in this situation? In fact, this question is an 
extreme example of the discretion vs. commitment debate in monetary policy. While a 
currency board is an extreme exchange rate commitment16, free floating gives much room for 
discretion in monetary policy (if there is no “home-made” commitment, which I have 
assumed away in this paper). If we have an explicit loss function of the society – which we do 
in the dynamic inconsistency model – we can make a judgement on this debate by comparing 
the expected values of this loss function under alternative arrangements.    
If the country has a floating exchange rate, the expected value of its loss function is 
( ) ( tttfloatt zkzkzkEE 2222 1111 σχχχχχχχχχ +++=
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  (19), 
where σ 2(zt) denotes the variance of supply-side shocks. The first term on the right-hand side 
of equation (19) is the cost for the society that is in equilibrium associated with the 
inflationary bias, while the second term captures the (optimised) welfare cost of supply-side 
shocks.  
 
14 The recent problems of Argentina illustrate this.  
15 No currency board was attacked and/or abandoned during this period. However, there were still speculations 
that the domestic currencies could be devaluated in Hong Kong and Argentina. In Hong Kong, though, it was 
partly supported by political considerations (unification with China) that can be thought of as an exogenous 
shock to the credibility of Hong Kong’s authorities. In Argentina, on the other hand, the currency board was 
made less credible by the fact that it serves as a lender of the last resort, and it this thus not a pure currency board 
(see Hanke, Schuler, 1994). The problems that hit Argentina in 2001-02, however, clearly showed that 
introducing a currency board is in itself not a guarantee that the country avoids crises, especially if the fiscal 
policy is not disciplined enough to make the currency board fully credible. 
16 Two even more extreme exchange rate commitments are a full dollarization (eurization etc.) and a monetary 
union. In this essay, however, I will treat them together with an orthodox currency board as a group of de-facto 
irrevocable exchange rate commitments. It is, of course,  true that a currency board can always be abandoned 
(after all, the same applies to dollarization and currency unions, too), but in the dynamic inconsistency model it 
is sufficient to assume that such a change cannot be quick enough to create nominal illusion and boost output.   
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 If, on the other hand, the country adopts a hard peg that does not allow it to realign 
even when the worst possible supply-side shocks take place, the expected value of the loss 
function becomes 
( ) ( ){ } ( ttfixt zkzkEE 222 σ+=−−=Λ )        
 (20). 
From a simple comparison of equations (19) and (20), it is easy to see that adopting a hard 
peg reduces the costs associated with the inflationary bias, but at the same time increases the 
costs of supply side shocks. There is thus a trade-off, which forms the core of the discretion-
versus-rules debate. 
 Choosing a hard peg is preferred to having a flexible exchange rate only if   
( ) ( ) ( ttt zkzkzk 222222 1      1
1 σχ )
χσσχ
χ
χ
χ
+≥⇔+≥++
+     (21), 
We can thus conclude that a currency board, dollarization, or monetary union is the more 
likely to be preferable for a country: 
(i) the higher is the inflationary bias k; 
(ii) the lower is the variability of supply side shocks σ 2(zt); 
(iii) the lower is the parameter χ.  
The first two results are easy to interpret: a high inflationary bias increases the desire of a 
country to import low inflation abroad, while having a low variability of supply-side shocks 
makes it less costly in terms of foregone discretion. The last result is a bit more difficult to 
explain. A low inflation-aversion χ increases the magnitude of inflationary bias, which speaks 
in favour of a fixed exchange rate and against discretion. On the other hand, a low χ also 
reduces the “unit” social costs of the inflationary bias and makes it also more desirable to 
respond to supply-side shocks by inflationary surprises, which speaks in favour of a floating 
exchange rate. The first factor, however, dominates in equilibrium, making a fixed exchange 
rate more advantageous when χ is low.  
III. An Extended Model with Non-Zero Foreign Inflation 
To enrich the model with optimum-currency-area considerations, I will now modify one 
of its simplifying assumptions. Namely, I will cease to assume that the foreign country 
maintains zero inflation in all circumstances. Instead, this country will be allowed to respond 
to its own supply-side shocks with non-zero inflation. A convenient assumption is that the 
foreign country has managed to develop an optimal institutional framework for its monetary 
policy, meaning that its inflation follows an exact analogue to equation (6), i.e.      
( ) ( tftffftft zzz 22   ;   ;1 σσχχχπ ==+= )        (22), 
where π f denotes foreign inflation and zf foreign supply-side shocks. In (22), I further assume 
that the inflation aversion χ is the same abroad as in the home country, and that foreign 
supply-side shocks have the same variance as the domestic ones. This greatly simplifies the 
algebra, but at the same time artificially removes some potentially important sources of 
asymmetry between countries. Therefore, I show in Appendix I what happens when the 
simplifying assumptions are relaxed.  
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 Under these new assumptions the equation (9) of section II, which expresses the value 
of domestic country’s loss function when a fixed exchange rate is maintained, modifies to   
( )
( ) [ ] [ ]tEtfttEtft
f
t
t
E
t
f
t
fix
t
zk
z
zkz
z
zkz
+++−++++=








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χπχ
χ
1
2
1
1       
11
22
2
2
     (23). 
If we compare (23) and (10), we can easily derive modified critical levels of the domestic 
supply-side shock that triggers a devaluation or revaluation of the exchange rate. The equation 
(12) modifies to 
( ) Etftt kczz πχ −−+=− 1           
 (24), 
while equation (14) becomes  
( ) Etftt kczz πχ −−+−=− 1         
 (25). 
In other words, it is now not the domestic supply-side shock on its own, but rather its 
difference from the foreign shock that matters for the decision whether to maintain a pegged 
exchange rate or not. The intuition behind this result is very simple: the optimal response to 
foreign shock is already reflected in the actions of foreign monetary authority, and the 
domestic central bank replicates this response by keeping the exchange rate fixed. If the 
domestic shock is equal to the foreign one, there is thus no desire to realign the exchange rate 
(besides that stemming from the inflationary bias itself). 
 Of course, the danger of self-fulfilling currency crises carries on to this extended 
version of the Obstfeld model, and the recommendation that countries should avoid 
intermediate exchange rate regimes thus remains valid.17 But the range of factors that 
influence the choice between floating and a hard peg broadens. The expected value of the loss 
function under floating is still given by equation (19), but its expected value under a fixed 
exchange rate (i.e. equation (20) of section II) modifies to   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )fttfttfixt zzzzkE ,cov1 21 1 222 χσχσ +−+++=Λ      (26), 
                                                 
17 To show this, it is enough to assume that the difference between z and zf is uniformly distributed on the 
interval [-Z;Z], and than proceed along the lines of Appendix I. The qualitative results then could be again 
illustrated by Figure 1. Alternatively, we could assume a tent-shaped distribution for this difference in supply 
side shocks (which seems to be more realistic) and then follow Obstfeld (1996b). We could also ask how the 
correlation between z and zf (which represents a condensed measure of the countries’ integration in this model) 
affects the possibility of self-fulfilling currency crises. It is realistic to expect that when the correlation is high, it 
reduces the dispersion of the difference between z and zf , i.e. it lowers Z. As was shown in section II, this 
paradoxically makes it more likely that a self-fulfilling crisis can take place (even though it reduces the 
probability of fundamentally justified realignments). In the logic of the present model, a smaller integration 
makes it possible that a strongly positive asymmetric shock will happen which will enable the central bank to 
sustain the exchange rate peg even when inflationary expectations are high with some positive probability, and 
the full-discretionary outcome is thus not an equilibrium (see section II).  
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where σ 2(zf)denotes the variance of foreign supply-side shocks and cov(z,zf) is the covariance 
between domestic and foreign supply-side shocks. A rigidly fixed exchange rate is thus 
preferred to floating if    
( ) ( ) ( )fttftt zzzzk ,cov1 21 11 11 222 χσχσχχ +−+++≥      (27). 
Using the assumption that the variance of foreign shocks is the same as that of domestic 
shocks, we can rewrite this as  
( ) ([ fttt zzzk ,112 22 ρσχ )]χ −+≥         
 (28), 
where ρ(z,zf) is the correlation coefficient between z and zf. This correlation coefficient 
represents a condensed measure of the degree of integration between economies in the present 
model. 
From (28), we can conclude that a currency board, dollarization, or monetary union is 
the more likely to be advantageous for a country: 
(i) the higher is the inflationary bias k; 
(ii) the lower is the variability of supply side shocks σ 2(zt); 
(iii) the lower is the parameter χ; 
(iv) the higher is the degree of integration measured by ρ(z,zf).   
The first three results need no special comment as they are the same as in section II. The last 
one, however, is the key result of this section. It says that an increasing integration between 
economies, here condensed in the correlation of their supply-side shocks, increases the 
desirability of a hard peg between these economies, as it reduces the cost of foregone 
discretion in monetary policy. This alone is not an innovative outcome, as it only replicates 
one of the central conclusions of the optimum-currency-area literature. Nevertheless, in this 
paper I demonstrated how this literature can be extended in a very simple model framework to 
allow for credibility considerations, which may be important when a country with low 
credibility of its monetary policy decides to introduce a currency board, dollarize its economy 
or join a monetary union.18 
We can give a simple graphical interpretation. The traditional optimum currency area 
theory (see Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963) is summarised in a textbook fashion in Figure 
3a). The costs of a monetary unification, which result primarily from reduced discretion in 
monetary policy, are a decreasing function of the degree of integration θ. On the other hand, 
the benefits are an increasing function of the degree of integration. These benefits include, 
inter alia, an elimination of exchange rate risk and reduction in transaction costs. It is optimal 
for a country to join the monetary union if the degree of integration exceeds the critical level 
θ*.  
 
                                                 
18 Frankel (1995), for example, discusses both credibility and the degree of integration in a single paper, but 
does not put these in a unified model setting. He just models increasing integration by arbitrarily putting a larger 
weight on the exchange rate stabilisation objective in the central bank’s loss function. Ricci (1997) presents a 
very interesting and complex model in which the optimality of a currency area depends on many factors 
including the correlation of real shocks between countries and the differences in their inflationary biases.  
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Figure 3: Optimum Currency Areas 
a) traditional approach    b) the present model  
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The present paper, however, ignores all the traditional benefits of currency integration, and 
instead concentrates on another potential benefit: the import of credibility from abroad that 
overcomes the inflationary bias (k). This benefit is independent of the degree of integration, 
which is why the benefits are plotted as a horizontal line in Figure 3b). Again, it is optimal for 
a country to join a monetary union if the degree of integration exceeds the critical level ρ*. 
But it is realistic to think that the credibility deficit is not the same across countries and time 
periods, which means that the line showing the benefits of a currency integration may shift up 
and down, changing the critical level of integration ρ*. 
An alternative (a little bit more schematic, but also quite illustrative) graphical 
presentation of the problem is shown in Figure 4. It is a simple matrix that is divided into four 
regions according to the degree of economic convergence (low/high) and credibility 
(+competence) of the central bank (low/high). In the upper-right region the convergence is 
high and credibility low, meaning that the costs of a hard peg are small and the potential 
benefits very large, and the hard peg is thus clearly a good option. On the other hand, in the 
lower-left region the costs of a hard peg are high due to a low degree of convergence, while 
the benefits are low due to a high level of central bank’s credibility, leading to a floating 
exchange rate as a natural choice. In the remaining two regions, the decision is not so easy. In 
the upper-left region both the costs and benefits of a hard peg are high, in the lower-right 
region both of these are low. This means that to find out whether a hard peg is a good idea, a 
more thorough analysis is needed for these two regions in order to determine if the benefits 
exceed costs or not. 
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Figure 4: Optimum Currency Areas – an alternative illustration 
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The above analysis may be used to respond to the arguments of Dornbusch and 
Giavazzi (1998), who advocated an adoption of currency boards in Central European 
countries to resolve their low credibility problem.19 The choice of an appropriate exchange 
rate regime is not as simple as Dornbusch and Giavazzi (1998) suggested, because the 
economic transition means in its nature an effort to move from the upper-left indecisive 
region of Figure 4 to the lower-right indecisive region. At the beginning of economic 
transition, the post-communist countries were typically only weakly integrated with advanced 
market economies. The potential costs of fixing the exchange rate were thus relatively high. 
In spite of this, however, many of these countries chose to peg the exchange rate. The reason 
is that they needed to import stability and anti-inflationary credibility from abroad. The 
potential benefits were extremely large, especially in the very early stage of transition. As 
time passed on, however, many transition countries made substantial progress both in 
integrating with the West and gaining more credibility – which Dornbusch and Giavazzi 
(1998) seem to ignore in their argument. Both the costs and benefits of a fixed exchange rate 
thus fell down, giving rise to a dilemma how to go on with the exchange rate regimes. 
Moreover, as the countries proceeded with the balance-of-payments liberalisation they 
became more vulnerable to currency crises, which was clearly demonstrated by the Czech 
experience, for example. As a result, the intermediate exchange rate regimes, such as pegged 
but adjustable exchange rates or crawling bands, became more risky, which further amplified 
the above dilemma.  
In such a situation, it is not easy to decide whether to radically strengthen the exchange 
rate commitment or move to managed floating. It depends on the (perceived) speed of two 
processes mentioned above, i.e. the convergence process and the gain in credibility. If the 
former one was faster, it should not be surprising to see the countries maintain and even 
strengthen their exchange rate commitments. If the latter one proceeded at higher pace, it 
should be no surprise to see the countries move to floating. Indeed, there are examples in both 
directions. Estonia, Bulgaria and Lithuania, for example, have introduced and maintained 
currency boards (even though not orthodox ones), while the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
                                                 
19 In addition, Dornbusch and Giavazzi (1998) have argued that central banks in post-communist countries have 
low policy competence. I abstract from this factor in the basic model of this section which assumes perfect 
competence of the central bank in discerning the supply-side shocks and setting the optimal inflation rate. In 
Appendix II, I show how policy errors of the central bank under discretion can make a fixed exchange rate more 
attractive, which lends support to the argument of Dornbusch and Giavazzi (1998).  
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Poland, for example, have moved to floating exchange rates. A priori, we cannot judge any of 
these as irrational choices, the judgement must be based on empirical measures of 
convergence and credibility. In the next section, I discuss such empirical measures for the 
Czech Republic. 
IV. A Discussion for the Czech Republic 
IV. 1 Monetary Policy Credibility and Competence in the Czech Republic  
Until February 1996, the Czech Republic used a pegged exchange rate regime. The 
inflation was moving between 8 % and 11 % since early 1994 (meaning one of the lowest 
inflation rates among the transition economies at that time), with a modest declining tendency. 
The Czech National Bank, though, was constantly missing its money-supply targets due to 
fast inflows of foreign short-term capital. The wage growth far exceeded productivity growth, 
real exchange rate was appreciating fast and the domestic demand growth (at around 8 % in 
1995-96) was also excessive, partly due to an expansive fiscal policy and the high wage 
growth. The economy got clearly overheated, which led to a mounting current account deficit 
that reached almost 8 % of GDP in 1996 (Figure 5). 
The CNB responded by widening the exchange rate’s fluctuation band in February 1996 
and by a set of restrictive monetary policy measures in the second half of 1996. These 
measures, however, proved to be insufficient. In May 1997, the Czech Republic experienced a 
currency turmoil that forced the CNB to float the exchange rate and intensify its restrictions. 
In addition, fiscal restrictions were introduced in the spring of 1997. As a result, a period of a 
painful stabilisation followed in 1997-99, marked by a drop in GDP (see Figure 5) and rising 
unemployment, but also by falling inflation and current account deficit. The years 2000-02 
then saw a revival in economic growth again, but this time without re-emergence of any 
serious macroeconomic imbalances (apart from the fiscal problems – see below).  
 
Figure 5: GDP Growth, Current Account Balance and Public Budgets  
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Source: Czech Statistical Office, CNB; Bezděk, Matalík (2000) 
 
Since 1998, the Czech National Bank introduced inflation targeting as its monetary 
policy strategy. Figure 6 compares its targets with the actual developments of net inflation 
19 
(CPI-inflation adjusted for price deregulations and changes in indirect taxes), which was the 
target indicator in 1998-2001. As we can see, the CNB undershot its targets in all three years 
since the adoption of inflation targeting, even though in 2000 by a relatively small margin 
only. Only in 2001, when the CNB already decided to switch towards targeting the headline 
inflation from 2002, did it manage to reach the target. The CNB was therefore criticised for 
being too hawkish in the first years of inflation targeting. At present, the Czech inflation again 
finds itself well below the CNB’s target corridor (even though it is largely due to exogenous 
factors). Combined with the relatively modest inflation rates throughout the whole transition, 
the price stability during the communist era and the stability of Czechoslovak crown between 
the world wars, this makes me believe that the CNB does not suffer from a lack of anti-
inflationary credibility, and thus feels no acute need to import it from abroad. 
 
Figure 6: Net Inflation – the Targets vs. Reality 
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O
shooting of the inflation targets may be used as an argument for low policy competence 
of the CNB, which would imply that the autonomy in monetary policy may be harmful rather 
than stabilising in the Czech reality, making a case for a fast unilateral of official euroization 
of the Czech economy. 
This argument, tho
 policy, the external shocks to inflation etc.20 I view as the primary reason of the painful 
stabilisation period a substantial overheating of the economy that took place in 1994-96, and a 
sub-optimal mix of policies that was subsequently used to stabilise it. The overheating 
occurred during a period of fixed exchange rate regime, which made the situation worse by 
attracting short-term capital inflows rather than preventing it. There is thus no reason to think 
 
20  I do not want to discuss the external shocks to inflation here, even though these have been very important. In 
1998-99, for example, the undershooting of inflation targets could be largely attributed to a drop in world oil 
prices and in food prices (see e.g. CNB, Inflation Report, January 2000). In 2000, on the other hand, the adverse 
oil price shock brought the net inflation closer to the target than it would have otherwise been. In 2002, it is low 
import and food prices, combined with a strong exchange rate, that are responsible for the target undershooting. 
20 
that such an overheating could not take place under a currency board or euroization of the 
economy as well. In such a case, it would either require a stabilising action from the fiscal 
policy side, or a deflationary adjustment. The fiscal policy in the Czech Republic, though, was 
rather pro-cyclical in the past. In Figure 5, I have plotted an estimate of the structural public 
budgets’ deficit.21 As we can see, the fiscal policy became expansionary in 1995-96, 
contributing to the economic overheating. The monetary policy started to respond in mid-
1996 by restrictive measures, but these were ineffective in reducing the current account deficit 
quickly, as they contributed to a short-run appreciation of the exchange rate, which had a 
negative impact on the trade balance. A fiscal restriction would have been much more 
appropriate at that time, but it was not implemented due to longer recognition lags and 
political cycle considerations (1996 was an election year). The fiscal policy was tightened 
only in 1997 and further in 1998, when the Czech economy had already entered an economic 
recession.  
It should be thus clear that one cannot put all the blame for the developments in the 
second half of the 1990s on monetary policy. True, one may for example argue (see e.g. 
Čihák
ment against having an independent monetary policy.23 It simply shows that the 
mone
                                                
 and Holub, 2001) that from the ex-post view the CNB should have lowered the interest 
rates faster in 1998 than it actually did, responding more aggressively to the fiscal restrictions 
and appreciating exchange rate.22 Such a move could have probably made the recession 
shorter and the undershooting of inflation targets smaller. But this ex-post assessment does 
not automatically mean that the resulting pattern of adjustment was harsher than it would have 
been without an independent monetary policy, i.e. during deflationary adjustment under a 
hard peg. 
I thus believe that the Czech experience in the second half of 1990s cannot be used as a 
clear argu
tary policy must be well mixed with fiscal policy to reduce the costs of stabilisation. If 
the fiscal policy is pro-cyclical and does not respond flexibly to the macroeconomic needs, 
serious problems may emerge. But this would be even more true with a currency board 
regime or euroization, under which the fiscal policy remains the only stabilisation policy tool. 
At present, the Czech fiscal policy is not ready to assume such a role.24 There are serious 
structural problems in public finance, combined with an expansive fiscal policy spending the 
privatisation revenues, that will cause the structural budget deficits to widen further to about 7 
% of GDP in 2002-03. This means that in the coming years a substantial fiscal consolidation 
will be needed. Unless the circumstances are really favourable, the fiscal policy will be a 
source of demand shocks rather than a stabilising element. The unresolved fiscal problems 
thus constitute a strong argument for having an independent monetary policy at the moment. 
 
21 I have borrowed this estimate from Bezděk and Matalík (2000). The structural deficit is adjusted for 
privatisation revenues and subsidies to the transformation institutions, i.e. for one-off operations that do not have 
direct implications for aggregate demand in the economy. This adjustment reflects the special features of a 
transition economy such as the Czech Republic.  
22 For this view, see e.g. IMF: “Czech Republic: Staff Report for the 2000 Article IV Consultation,” August 
2000. However, as the IMF also pointed out, fears prevailed in 1998 that the emerging market crises might 
undermine stability of the CZK and lead to quick reversals in capital flows. These concerns may serve as an ex-
ante explanation of why the interest rate cuts were slower in 1998 than is now perhaps viewed as optimal. 
23 Moreover, I believe that the past policy (ex-post) errors can be largely attributed to the uncertainty about 
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. If transmission mechanisms in the Czech Republic differ from 
those in the EU, it is another source of asymmetry – in addition to those that I discuss in sub-section IV.2 – that 
supports the arguments against euroizing quickly. This point was stressed e.g. by Janáčková (1998).   
24 As Fischer (2001) pointed out, “fiscal policy can play a counter-cyclical role provided the fiscal situation is 
strong enough in normal times for fiscal easing during a recession not to raise any questions about the long-term 
fiscal sustainability.”  
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It is also true, however, that the recent developments strengthened the arguments of the 
people favouring a fast eurozone accession. Since late 2001, there has been a sharp 
appre
ominal and Real Effective Exchange Rate of the CZK 
te a strong argument for 
st on three grounds: (i) If we believe it is good to adopt euro 
st to avoid exchange rate volatility, it is necessary to fix the fiscal situation to be able to 
nter (Maastricht criteria and the Growth and Stability Pact) and to survive the entry 
smoo
we can hardly measure their cross-country 
ciation both in the nominal and real effective exchange rate of the CZK (see Figure 7). 
Even though there are good reasons for a long-run real appreciation trend, its recent speed 
(10-15 % y/y in real terms) seems to be by far excessive. The CNB has called this 
development “a bubble” and responded quite actively with a set of measures (an agreement 
with the government to convert its FX revenues through the CNB’s FX reserves; direct FX 
interventions in the market; interest rate cuts etc.). If the CNB’s judgement is correct, which I 
believe it is, it shows that the exchange rate may be a source of serious shocks for the 
economy, rather than a shock-absorber. This makes a case for a fast euroisation. At present, 
though, we still do not have sufficient evidence how much the strong crown actually hurt the 
economy. 
 
Figure 7: N
 Source: Czech National Bank 
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In any case, the recent exchange rate developments also constitu
a fast fiscal consolidation at lea
fa
e
thly. (ii) The current exchange rate bubble was originally initiated by the expectations of 
high privatisation inflows which the government would want to spend – it was thus connected 
to the fiscal expansion, at least indirectly. (iii) To the extent that the expansive fiscal policy 
puts an upward pressure on the interest rates (which, however, are very low at present), it also 
pushes the exchange rate to the strong side.      
IV.2. Czech Republic’s Degree of Integration with the EU 
In the model analysis of section III, the only measure of integration between economies 
was the correlation of their supply-side shocks. In reality, however, the sources of potential 
shocks are likely to be very diverse, and 
correlations. Therefore, it is difficult to find a universal, comprehensive measure of the degree 
22 
of integration among countries in practice. We thus have to rely on a range of indirect 
indicators.  
Cincibuch and Vávra (2000) provide some of these indicators for the Czech Republic. 
Among the factors that speak in favour of a fast monetary integration with the EU, they point 
out to a substantially increased correlation between the Czech and German business cycles 
over the last years, increasing share of the EU on Czech exports and growing share of intra-
indus
U now accounts roughly for 70 % of total 
 been observed in the commodity structure of 
f higher-value-added products (i.e. machinery, transport 
quipment, industrial consumer goods) is growing steadily, and has already reached 60 %. 
his should lead to an increasing synchronisation of the Czech business cycle with the EU 
(see C
                                                
try trade with the EU. Among the factors that speak in the opposite direction they stress 
the existing tight links of the Czech Republic with the CEFTA countries and strong wage 
shocks coming from the labour market. In the following text, I reproduce some of their 
arguments and present a few other indicators, trying to infer their implications for the optimal 
exchange rate regime before our E(M)U-accession. 
 Probably the most frequently used measures of the degree of integration are the 
territorial and commodity structure of foreign trade, together with the economic openness. 
From this point of view, the Czech Republic has achieved a substantial progress in its 
convergence to the EU. As shown in Figure 8, the E
Czech exports.25 The importance of these developments is underlined by the Czech 
Republic’s large degree of economic openness, the total exports of goods and services 
reaching more than 70 % of GDP.  
 
Figure 8: Trade Convergence to the EU 
 Source: Czech Statistical Office 
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incibuch and Vávra, 2000) and reduced probability of asymmetric shocks. In the recent 
years, though, the Czech business cycle has not been synchronised with the EU (Figure 9), 
 
25  In Hungary, the EU’s share slightly exceeds 75 %, in Poland 70 % and in Slovakia 60 %. 
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which may be an argument against a fast eurozone entry (if one does not believe that the 
Czech cycle is generated by the monetary policy and/or the exchange rate fluctuations). 
 
Figure 9: Cyclical Convergence with the EU 
 Source: Czech Statistical Office  
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The trade convergence is being facilitated by an increasing integration with the EU in 
of foreign direct investment to the Czech Republic has 
accelerated substantially in the last three years. As a result, more and more Czech companies 
becom  members of international conglomerates, and should thus be subjected to the same 
kinds
ech real GDP 
measu
the ownership area. The inflow 
e
 of external shocks as their foreign parents and sisters. Given the fact that the EU 
accounts for 85 % of all FDIs in the Czech Republic (see Figure 10 below), this considerably 
reduces the danger of asymmetric shocks between the EU and Czech Republic. 
On the other hand, there are also some reasons to believe that the current degree of 
Czech Republic’s integration with the EU is not sufficient to justify an effort to join the 
monetary union quickly. One of them is related to the problem of real and nominal 
convergence to the advanced EU countries. As shown in Figure 11, the Cz
red in purchasing power parity (PPP) reaches just about 60 % of the EU average (and is 
even much less measured by current exchange rate). While this is the second highest level 
among all Central and Eastern European applicants to the EU (behind Slovenia), it is still well 
below even the least advanced EU-countries. The process of real EU-convergence, that will 
hopefully take place in the future, will probably have different speeds in different economic 
sectors and geographic regions, which may be viewed as a kind of asymmetric supply-side 
shocks in relation to the EU. The process of real convergence will thus create challenges for 
the stabilisation policies that a common EMU monetary policy could not reflect.     
 
Figure 10: “Ownership Convergence” with the EU 
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Source: Czech National Bank, own computations 
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The real convergence problem is related to the price convergence problem. At present, 
e 
epublic, as the cross-country comparisons 
onfirm there is a strong empirical correlation between the real GDP and price levels in 
indivi
                                                
the average Czech price level reaches just about 40 % of the EU average. Partly, this can b
attributed to the low GDP level in the Czech R
c
dual countries (see Figure 11). Nevertheless, the GDP-price level relationship cannot 
explain the low Czech price level fully, as the Czech Republic lies far below the regression 
line in Figure 11 (by more than 15 % points), having one the largest negative residuals. There 
is no clear consensus on why this is the case (for some alternative explanations see e.g. Holub, 
Čihák, 2000; Čihák, Holub, 2001), but there seems to be a consensus that the nominal 
convergence will be an important part of our overall economic convergence to the EU. The 
average Czech price level thus should be growing over time, which is equivalent to a long-run 
real exchange rate appreciation. This, of course, will mean a challenge for stabilisation 
policies that may be taken into account only if the Czech Republic performs its own 
independent monetary policy.26 In addition, the timing of this expected real exchange rate 
appreciation is a big source of uncertainty, which could seriously undermine the credibility of 
any exchange rate peg.  
 
 
26 Frankel (1995), for example, writes: “A country experiencing sustained rapid productivity growth will 
eventually have to allow its currency to appreciate in real terms. The implication for the choice of monetary 
regime is that, if a country hopes seriously to maintain an inflation rate no higher than that of its major trading 
partners, fixing the exchange rate cannot be a permanent policy; eventually there will have to be an upward 
revaluation.”  
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Figure 11: Real and Nominal Convergence 
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Moreover, as stressed in Holub, Čihák (2000), the core of the price convergence 
probl  
he 
s 
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Figure 12: Distribution of Czech Prices Compared to Germany (1999) 
em consists not so much in the low average price level itself, but rather in the high
dispersion of individual prices around this low average (see Figure 12). This means that t
system of Czech relative prices differs substantially from that in advanced EU economies. A
the Czech Republic converges to the EU, these relative price differences should be gradually 
reduced. This means that the price growth will have different speeds for each commodity 
group, which can be loosely interpreted as structural supply-side shocks. Moreover, if the 
prices are downward-sticky, the relative price adjustment will push on higher inflation in th
Czech Republic (by 2 - 4 % points – see Holub, Čihák, 2000) which will be yet another 
challenge for the Czech monetary policy. 
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 Finally, the Czech economy showed significant supply-side weaknesses in the recent 
past due to institutional and structural problems. The “institutional convergence” can thus be 
thought of as another issue that may contribute to asymmetric developments between the 
Czech Republic and the EU, and reduce credibility of any exchange rate peg. But in this 
respect, the Czech Republic has made substantial progress. Perhaps the most striking example 
is the banks reform, which was de facto finished in 2001 with a sale of the last large state-
owned bank to a foreign strategic partner. Nowadays, foreigner control more than 70 % of 
Czech bank equity and 95 % of bank assets. The foreign owners are expected to financially 
stabilise the banks, improve their efficiency and, perhaps most importantly, to supply the 
much needed know-how in modern banking. As a result, it may be hoped that the Czech 
banks do not constitute a threat to the Czech macroeconomic stability in the foreseeable 
future, and that their behaviour might become more standard, perhaps helping increase the 
symmetry of monetary transmission with the advanced countries. 
To sum up, I believe that there are both pros and cons for a fast euroisation. There 
onetary policy from abroad. As a result, 
 is unwise to think of any other possibility than the official eurozone entry. But an official 
EMU its 
 
l 
that, 
7-08. 
nal 
nd 
rs 
peg 
seems to be no urgent need to import credibility of m
it
 membership remains an indisputable medium-run target. The only issue is thus 
timing. And as the cost-benefit analysis gives no clear answer to this, we find ourselves in a
situation when the politics take over the economics in the decision-making. The crucia
prerequisite for the timing will most probably be the pace of fiscal consolidation. Due to 
it seems unrealistic at present that the Czech Republic could join the EMU before 200
The positive side of this is that in this time horizon, the main risks of monetary integration can 
be further reduced by the on-going convergence process. In the meantime, the Czech Natio
Bank should continue to carry out its independent monetary policy of inflation targeting a
managed floating of the exchange rate. The ERM2 entry should take place just two yea
before the expected eurozone entry, as this exchange rate regime belongs to the soft 
category which I criticised in section II.   
V. Summary and Conclusions 
tries can try to reduce their 
credib
 area literature. In the present paper, however, it was 
derived in a very simp  considerations with 
the ru
In this paper, I discussed how emerging and transition coun
ility deficit by importing low inflation from abroad via fixed exchange rates. Using the 
standard Obstfeld model of exchange rate pegs I demonstrated the danger of self-fulfilling 
currency crises. This danger explains why the economists and politicians currently favour the 
corner (polar) exchange rate solutions: either floating or very rigidly fixed exchange rates. I 
discussed the essence of currency boards as “self-destructing commitments” that can 
eliminate the danger of self-fulfilling crises. I also showed that a currency board or 
dollarization/euroization is more advantageous for a country if its inflationary bias (or, loosely 
speaking, its credibility deficit) is high and the variability of supply-side shocks is low. This is 
a standard result in the rules-versus-discretion debate. 
In section III, I demonstrated how the decision whether to adopt a rigidly fixed 
exchange rate or not depends on the degree of country’s integration with the foreign economy, 
the currency of which is used as an exchange rate anchor. I showed that increasing correlation 
between the shocks in both regions can reduce the costs of their monetary integration. This is 
a standard result of the optimum currency
le model that integrates the optimum-currency-area
les-versus-discretion debate.  
In an appendix, I also show the impact of another asymmetries between countries. 
These include differences in the variability of foreign and domestic supply-side shocks and 
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differences in the inflation aversions of countries. If the correlation of shocks is not perfect, it 
may be desirable to have some asymmetries in the other areas, too. In particular, it may be 
wise to fix the exchange rate to the currency of a country that suffers from smaller supply-side 
shocks and has higher inflation aversion than the domestic country does. These conclusions 
seem to run against the common wisdom that reducing the degree of asymmetries in every 
parameter is always good for monetary unification. 
Finally, I used the model analysis to argue with the recommendations of Dornbuch and 
Giava
es in their convergence to the advanced EU countries, it 
may b
e been reduced by that time. Before the 
EMU
zzi (1998) that the CEE countries should adopt currency boards to resolve their 
credibility problem. In my opinion, these authors ignore the fact that both the credibility of 
post-communist countries and their integration with the West tend to increase over time. In 
such a situation it is not easy to give a universal recommendation on the appropriate exchange 
rate regime for all post-communist economies. For those countries that have achieved a 
substantial progress in building credibility and expertise of their monetary policies, and at the 
same time still face many challeng
e perfectly rational to have independent monetary policies with floating exchange rates 
before their official E(M)U-accession. I argued, that the Czech Republic belongs to such 
countries. It is true that our integration with the EU is relatively large when measured by the 
degree of economic openness and structure of foreign trade. On the other hand, there are other 
indicators showing that our economic transition and convergence to the EU is still far from 
being completed. In this situation, it would not be wise to speed up the monetary integration 
with the EU artificially. On the other hand, if we join the EMU around the year 2007-08, 
which seems to be a realistic scenario at present given the existing political constraints, it may 
be hoped that the major convergence risks will hav
 accession, the CNB should continue to carry out its independent monetary policy of 
inflation targeting and managed floating of the exchange rate. The ERM2 period should be 
kept down to the minimum of two years, as this exchange rate regime belongs to the 
unpopular and dangerous category of soft pegs.       
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 Appendix I: Additional Sources of Asymmetry Between 
Countries  
In equation (22), I assumed that countries do not differ in the variability of their supply-
side shocks and their inflation aversions. In practice, however, such differences may be 
important. In this appendix, I analyse how the model of section III changes if either of these 
two assumptions is relaxed. 
 
1) Differences in the variability of shocks  
I will assume that the variability of foreign shocks is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1   ; 1 22 −≥+= λσλσ tft zz         
 (AI-1). 
If λ is below zero, it means that the foreign country is hit by less volatile supply-side shocks 
than the home country, and vice versa. All other assumptions remain the same as in section 
III. 
 We can use (AI-1) to rewrite equation (26) as  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )fttfttfixt zzzzkE ,11 212 222 ρλσχσχ λχ ++−+ +++=Λ     (AI-
2). 
It is thus preferred for the home country to have a rigidly fixed exchange rate in this setting if 
( ) ( ) ( )[ fttt zzzk ,1221 22 ρλλσχ ]χ +−++≥       
 (AI-3). 
The second term in the square bracket on the right-hand side is directly increasing with λ. If 
the correlation between the domestic and foreign supply-side shocks is negative, the last term 
in increasing in λ, too, meaning that the argument of the square bracket is smallest for λ=-1. 
For a non-negative correlation of supply-side shocks, the last term in the square bracket is 
decreasing in λ. We can find the optimal value of λ by differentiating the right-hand side of 
(AI-3) with respect to λ. We get the first-order condition 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1,      0,111 2 −=⇔=+− fttftt zzzz ρλρλ       (AI-
4). 
 If the positive correlation of supply-side shocks is perfect, it is most convenient if the 
foreign country also has the same variability of supply-side shocks as the home one. 
Otherwise, the responses to supply-side shocks that are imported from abroad are not optimal 
for the home country, despite the perfect correlation of shocks. On the other hand, if the 
correlation is zero, the home country wants the foreign shocks to be as small as possible (i.e. 
λ close to –1). The foreign central bank’s responses to supply-side shocks are a nuisance for 
the home country, and it thus wants these responses to be minimal (the same logic explains 
why it wants λ=-1 if the correlation of shocks is negative). In the general case when the 
correlation coefficient is between zero and one, the home country prefers λ to be above minus 
one, but below zero. In other words, if the possibility of asymmetric shocks cannot be fully 
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avoided, the home country would ideally want to peg its currency to a country that is more 
stable in terms of its supply-side shocks.  
 One can also give a simple graphical interpretation of the above findings (see Figure 
AI-1). If λ<0, the intercept of the costs line in Figure 3b) shifts downward and the whole 
curve becomes flatter (see equation AI-2). Moreover, with λ<0 the costs of a hard peg can 
never decline to zero for ρ=1. As a result, these costs go down for lower correlations of 
shocks and up for higher correlations of shocks. Only for one level of correlation (denoted ρA 
in Figure AI-1) the costs stay the same. We can thus clearly see that if the correlation is below 
some level (i.e. below ρA in the case of Figure AI-1; but in general if it is below 1) it is better 
for a country if the variability of foreign shocks is smaller than the variability of domestic 
shocks.    
 
Figure AI-1: Additional Sources of Asymmetry – a graphical illustration 
a)           b) 
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We may also ask if for a given level of asymmetry in the variability of shocks (i.e. for a 
given λ<0), the minimum correlation of shocks required for a hard peg is smaller or greater 
than for perfect symmetry in the variability of shocks. The answer to this question is not clear, 
however, as is depends on the exact situation. In particular, if ρA<ρ* as in Figure AI-1a), the 
minimum required correlation of shocks goes up to ρB>ρ*. On the other hand, if ρA>ρ*, the 
break-even point for the correlation of shocks goes down to ρB<ρ* as in Figure AI-1b).  
 
2) Differences in the inflation aversion  
Now I will assume that the two countries differ in their inflation aversion, denoting the 
foreign inflation aversion by χf. Again, I keep all the other assumptions of section III 
(including the equal variability of shocks). It is not difficult to show that in this setting 
equation (26) modifies to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 


 ++−+
++=Λ 1,
1
2
1
1
2
22 f
ttfft
fix
t zzzkE ρχχ
χσ     (AI-5). 
It is preferable for the home country to have a fixed exchange rate if  
( ) ( ) ( ) 



+++−+
+≥ χρχχ
χχσ
1
1,
1
2
1
1
2
22 f
ttfft
zzzk      (AI-
6). 
If the correlation of supply-side shocks between the two countries is negative, the term in the 
square bracket on the right-hand side is decreasing in χf, which means that you would ideally 
like χf →∞. If the correlation is non-negative, we can find the optimal level of foreign 
inflation aversion by differentiating the argument of the square bracket with respect to χf and 
setting this derivative equal to zero. This leads to the first-order condition 
( ) ( ) 1,1      ,11 −+=⇔=++ fttffttf zzzz ρ
χχρχ
χ       (AI-7). 
 This means that for a perfect positive correlation of supply-side shocks the home 
country welcomes if the foreign country has the same inflation aversion, because in this 
situation the foreign central bank’s policy actions are optimal for you. On the other hand, if 
the correlation is zero, the home country wants χf →∞. The logic is the same as in the 
previous case of differing shock variances. The foreign central bank’s responses to shocks 
represent a nuisance for the home country if shocks are non-correlated. The home country 
thus wants these responses to be minimal, which is achieved if the foreign central bank does 
not care about output but only about stabilising inflation at its zero target. For the general case 
when the correlation of shocks is between zero and one, the home country prefers χf 
somewhere above χ. This means that it welcomes if the foreign country is more inflation-
averse. 
 The graphical illustration of this situation is the same as in Figure AI-1 above.  
 
The following general lesson can be drawn from this appendix. When there exist 
asymmetric shocks, the home country may prefer to have some asymmetry in other 
parameters of the economies as well, that would lead to smaller responses of the foreign 
central bank to supply-side shocks compared to the optimal responses of the domestic central 
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bank. The desired asymmetries include a lower variability of foreign shocks and a higher 
inflation aversion abroad.27 These conclusions seem to run against the common wisdom that 
reducing the degree of asymmetries in every single parameter is good for monetary unions in 
any situation.  
In practice, it is quite realistic to assume that the advanced countries, whose currencies 
are the most serious candidates to become nominal anchors for the currencies of less 
developed countries, are hit by smaller supply-side shocks on average. This is because their 
labour markets are more stabilised, productivity growth is more balanced and their 
dependence on raw-materials and agricultural production (i.e. the industries with most volatile 
production and prices) may be relatively weaker than in the emerging and transition countries. 
Also, it is realistic to expect that these countries have a relatively high degree of inflation 
aversion. This increases their attractiveness as exchange rate anchors for the currencies of 
emerging economies.  
                                                 
27 Another source of asymmetry could be a difference in the slopes of domestic and foreign supply curves. This 
factor was not explicitly taken into account in this paper for computational simplicity. If the slope of the foreign 
supply curve β was in general different from unity (i.e. the assumed slope of the domestic supply curve), it 
would be optimal for the foreign country to follow a policy given by f
t
f
t zχβ
βπ += 2   
(see e.g. Frankel, 1995; Obstfeld, 1996b). This means that a change in β  may have similar impacts as a change 
in χ (but the responsiveness to supply-side shocks is not a monotonic function of β, and depends on its 
relationship to χ). 
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Appendix II: Policy Errors  
In this appendix, I relax the assumption that the domestic central bank makes no policy 
errors under discretion. I will model these errors by introducing a white-noise shock to the 
central bank’s reaction function of equation (4). In particular, I will assume that under 
discretion the central bank sets inflation to     
t
t
E
t zk εχ
ππ +++=
+1t
          
 (AII-1). 
As a result, the expected value of central bank’s loss function under floating modifies 
from equation (19) to  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ttfloatt zkE εσχσχ )χχχ 222 111 +++++=Λ        (AII-
2). 
The inequality (28) then changes to 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( tfttt zzzk εχσχρσχ )χ 222 1,112 +−−+≥       (AII-
3). 
 The central bank’s errors thus make fixing the exchange rate more attractive, as the 
discretionary policy under floating makes the economy subject to undesirable policy shocks. 
This effect is the stronger the larger is the inflation aversion χ. In the graphical interpretation 
of Figure 2b), the policy errors shift the costs of foregone discretion downwards, reducing the 
critical level of integration that is needed for a monetary integration to be optimal (see Figure 
AII-1). 
 
Figure AII-1: Policy Errors and the Costs of Monetary Unification 
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